Abstract-Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by Blaze et al. in 1998, allows a semi-trusted proxy with the re-encryption key to translate a ciphertext under the delegator into another ciphertext, which can be decrypted by the delegatee. In this process, the proxy is required to know nothing about the plaintext. Many PRE schemes have been proposed so far, however until now almost all the unidirectional PRE schemes suffer from the transferable property. That is, if the proxy and a set of delegatees collude, they can re-delegate the delegator's decryption rights to the other ones, while the delegator has no agreement on this. Thus designing nontransferable unidirectional PRE scheme is an important open research problem in the field. In this paper, we tackle this open problem by using the composite order bilinear pairing. Concretely, we design a non-transferable unidirectional PRE scheme based on Hohenberger et al.'s unidirectional PRE scheme. Furthermore, we discuss our scheme's application to secure cloud storage, especially for sharing private multimedia content for social cloud storage users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Proxy re-encryption scheme was first proposed by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [1] in 1998, which allows the proxy to transform a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext of the same message for Bob. During the transformation, the proxy learns nothing about the underlying message. In 2005, Ateniese et al. [2] first proposed a unidirectional proxy re-encryption and defined nine interesting notions for proxy re-encryption: unidirectional, non-interactive, proxy invisible, originalaccess, key optimal, collusion-safe, temporary, nontransitive, non-transferable. Until now, there have not been defined yet PRE schemes satisfying these nine properties simultaneously. Among these properties, non-transferability seems to be a very difficult one to achieve. A proxy re-encryption scheme is said to be non-transferable if the proxy and a set of colluding delegatees cannot re-delegate decryption rights to other parties without compromising any malicious delegatee's decryption capability, in the sense that the only way for Bob to transfer Alice's decryption capability is to expose his own secret key. In all known PRE constructions, if Bob and a malicious proxy collude, they can derive new re-encryption keys for Charlie without Alice's agreement. Non-transferable property can be seen as a trade-off solution to protect Alice's benefit in delegating her decryption right: when a malicious delegatee Bob colludes with the proxy to transfer Alice's decryption capability to others, he must expose his own decryption capability as a pay. This notion emphasis that Bob cannot collude with the proxy and transfer Alice's decryption right without compromising his own decryption capability. Since its introduction, PRE scheme has found many applications, such as key distribution [1] , key escrow [3] , distributed file systems [2] , [4] , multicast [5] , anonymous communication [6] . Recently, along with the rapid development of cloud computation [7] - [9] . More recently, PRE has been used extensively in secure cloud storage for content sharing such as DFA-based FPRE system [10] - [13] .
A. Our Contribution
To the best of our knowledge, until now there are no natural non-transferable proxy re-encryption schemes without obfuscation or involving with PKG. In this paper, we tackle the non-transferable problem by using the composite order bilinear pairing. Concretely, we design a non-transferable scheme based on Hohenberger et al.'s unidirectional PRE scheme (Shacham's Linear Encryption Scheme). We also present a secure social cloud storage sharing framework based on our non-transferable proxy re-encryption scheme.
B. Organization
Our paper is organized as the following: In Section II, we first review Hohenberger et al. ' s PRE scheme and then propose our construction based on it. We also roughly sketch the analysis of our scheme and show it can achieve non-transferability. In Section III, we present a framework for secure social cloud storage sharing based on our proposal. We conclude our paper in the last Section IV.
II. OUR CONSTRUCTION A. Review of Hohenberger et al.'s unidirectional PRE scheme
In this subsection, we review of Hohenberger et al.'s unidirectional PRE scheme proposed in TCC'07 [14] , based on which we propose our construction.
1) Setup. The scheme operating over two groups G 1 , G 2 of prime order q with a bilinear map e :
lishing the re-encryption key
computed from A's secret key and B's public key. 4) Second-Level Encryption. To encrypt a message m ∈ G under pk A in such a way that it can be decrypted by A and her delegatees, the encrypter computes
as the ciphertext. 5) First-Level Encryption. To encrypt a message m ∈ G 2 under pk A in such a way that it can only be decrypted by the holder of sk A , output
6) Re-Encryption. The proxy can re-encrypt a second-level ciphertext for A into a first-level ciphertext for B with rk A→B . From
B. Our Proposal

1)
Setup. The scheme operates over two groups G 1 , G 2 of composite order n = pqh with a bilinear map e : 
computed from A's secret key and B's public key. 4) Second-Level Encryption. To encrypt a message m under pk A in such a way that it can be decrypted by A and her delegatees, the encrypter computes:
s q ) as the ciphertext. 5) First-Level Encryption. To encrypt a message m under pk A in such a way that it can only be decrypted by the holder of sk A , output: Finally the proxy computes
with secret key sk A = (a 1 , b 1 , c 1 ) , A computes
and then output message m in the message space
Of course, to ensure efficient decryption, this limits the size of the message space M to be a polynomial.
Of course, to ensure efficient decryption, this limits the size of the message space M to be a polynomial size. Remark 1: Why our scheme can achieve nontransferable property? We can see from:
and the delegatee's secret key, other user C's secret key:
Thus, the colluders can not compute:
III. NT-PRE FOR SECURE SOCIAL CLOUD STORAGE SHARING
The secure social cloud storage sharing framework can be designed, using our scheme, as following:
1) Data outsourcing. When Alice travels outside and wants to share her personal multimedia content, e.g. pictures, with others, she first encrypts her own traveling photos by the standard encryption method for JPEG pictures, such as the block cipher, and then encrypts the block cipher key with her own public key. Finally, she outsources the ciphertexts to the cloud, which not only saves her storage but also is convenient for sharing data contents with other persons. 2) Delegation of Re-encryption. When one of her close friends, say Bob, wants to access her photos, he cannot decrypt Alice's ciphertext directly, because the photos are encrypted under Alice's public key. In this case, proxy re-encryption can be used. Alice generates a re-encryption key RK from Alice to Bob and sends it to the proxy, which can be a designated server lying in the cloud. 3) Re-encryption. The proxy first retrieves Alice's ciphertexts from the cloud storage servers, and applies the re-encryption key RK to re-encrypt Alice's ciphertexts into Bob's ciphertexts which Bob can decrypt with his own private key. Then, the proxy sends the re-encrypted ciphertexts to Bob. 4) Data Sharing. Bob uses his own private key to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertexts, through which Alice shares her photos with Bob in the cloud. We note that during the whole reencryption process, the sender Alice is online only when sending the re-encryption key. Besides, we also note that our NT-PRE scheme prevents a malicious cloud colluding with Bob to further re-delegate Alice's decryption rights to another user Carol, which guaranteed by the non-transferability property of our scheme (see Fig. 1 ). 
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present a new proposal on nontransferable proxy re-encryption. To the best of our knowledge, this proposal is the first natural proxy re-encryption scheme with non-transferable property without obfuscation or involving PKG in the identity based setting. Furthermore, we discuss our scheme's application to social cloud storage sharing, such as secure photos sharing, etc. Our scheme can be used to solve the difficult transferability problem, which can reduce the data owner's worries about their uncontrolled data sharing. There are several interesting aspects that can be further explored, such as proving our proposals' security formally, proposing more efficient non-transferable proxy re-encryption scheme in the prime order group, etc.
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